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Abstract
The COVID-19 pandemic has created new opportunities for organized criminal 
groups and confronted them with new challenges. Analysis of how these groups have 
reacted to the pandemic yields better understanding of how they work and enables 
the devising of more effective counter-strategies. To this end, we identified illustra-
tive cases regarding the provision of illegal governance and infiltration of the legal 
economy by conducting a systematic content analysis of international media articles 
and institutional reports published during the first eight months after the outbreak of 
the pandemic (January to August 2020). These cases were further analyzed in order 
to cluster the behavior of criminal groups in response to the COVID-19 emergency, 
and the means by which they tried to exploit the pandemic to strengthen their politi-
cal and economic power. We found that different governance-type criminal groups 
proposed themselves as institutions able to mitigate the burdens imposed by the 
pandemic by providing support to people in need and enforcing social-distancing 
measures. Further, identified cases did not provide evidence of groups devoted to the 
provision of illicit services and goods assuming any governance role. In this respect, 
the available evidence supports previous knowledge about organized crime. Cases of 
misappropriation of public funds and organized crime infiltration of the legal econ-
omy seem less common, at least in the first phase of the pandemic. The wholesale 
distribution of pharmaceuticals and medicines has been the sector targeted the most.
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addressed the reviewers’ comments, reviewed and approved the final manuscript. The authors would 
like to acknowledge that this paper builds on the work made by the authors in supporting UNODC 
for the report “The impact of COVID-19 on organized crime”.
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Introduction
Since the beginning of 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic and the related containment 
policies have modified the environment in which organized crime groups (OCGs) 
operate. COVID-19 generated (a) pressure for rapid and effective governance to 
contain the pandemic, and (b) an economic recession. These changes may affect 
OCGs’ strategies, thus providing an opportunity to investigate how these organiza-
tions work when dealing with global crises. Finding evidence on how some OCGs 
have reacted to the social and economic transformation introduced by COVID-19 is 
important to devise fair and effective policies aimed both at containing the pandemic 
and sustaining the economic system. Moreover, it supports the fight against organ-
ized crime (OC) in a world that is in many ways different from what it used to be 
before COVID-19, and where official figures and reports are not always available in 
a timely manner. Indeed, due to the transformations induced by the pandemic, OCGs 
had greater opportunities to further infiltrate the legal economy and to strengthen 
their illegal governance, possibly posing additional threats for governments.
Analyzing OCGs’ reaction to COVID-19 helps also to gain greater insights into 
contemporary OCGs. Indeed, two distinctive features of structured OCGs are pos-
sibly relevant in the pandemic and post-pandemic scenarios. On the one hand, it is 
OCGs’ capacity to present themselves as providers of governance, which relates to 
the need for effective decision-making induced by the pandemic. On the other hand, 
the same groups have the capacity to infiltrate the legal economy, which relates to 
the economic crisis induced by COVID-19. The COVID-19 crisis allows investiga-
tion on OCGs that emerge as providers of governance, how they do so, and in what 
circumstances. Similarly, it is possible to examine evidence on industries OCGs 
appear to target the most and their reactions to governments’ investments to meet 
healthcare costs and support their economies.
OCGs’ provision of illegal governance and their infiltration of the legal economy 
since the onset of the pandemic are much debated by international and supranational 
organizations, scholars and activists. Nonetheless, empirical studies on these top-
ics are scant. This study conducts an exploratory investigation of this issue. It does 
so by analyzing illustrative cases of OCGs’ activities reported by media and inter-
national organizations, at international level, covering the period from January to 
August 2020. In doing so, it provides a qualitative assessment based on reported 
cases and official evidence rather than on theoretical speculations. No academic 
studies of this kind are currently available, to the best of our knowledge.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section underlines the gap of knowl-
edge that this study aims to address by providing a survey of the few available empir-
ical publications on COVID-19 and organized crime followed by a description of 
the various criminal dynamics investigated by this study in the broader literature on 
OCGs. The methodological section describes the features of the content analysis at 
the basis of this study and the limitations of using media sources for data collection. 
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The results section highlights how different types of OCGs appear to provide dif-
ferent forms of governance and the mechanisms behind OC infiltration of the legal 
economy in the aftermath of the pandemic as emerging from the analysis of identi-
fied cases. Then, in the Discussion section, we analyze both sets of results in light of 
the theoretical literature. The paper concludes by considering policy implications.
Literature review
Since the onset of COVID-19 in early 2020, a number of scientists have investi-
gated the impact of the virus on many volume and urban crimes in different parts of 
the world as well as in the cyber-space (e.g., Ashby 2020; Campedelli et al. 2020; 
Gerell et al. 2020; Lallie et al. 2021). Moreover, several studies have considered the 
challenges posed by the possible reactions of OCGs to the COVID-19 pandemic 
(e.g., Dellasega and Vorrath 2020; GITOC 2020a). These studies on OCGs mostly 
investigate various types of social and institutional vulnerabilities, and they outline 
possible future scenarios on the basis of theoretical reasoning and the observation 
of macro trends such as the drop in international migration or the increase in coro-
navirus-related phishing frauds. However, empirical studies investigating organized 
criminal activities are rare, as the observation of OCGs’ actions is difficult, some-
time impossible, in such a short period. The specific topics investigated by the few 
available studies are quite various ranging from the provision of illegal governance 
to the evolution of OCGs’ criminal activities. In terms of geo-political focus, most 
studies concentrated on Latin American countries; while only an analysis considers 
a different area: the Western Balkans.
Bruce et al. (2020) examine how different forms of territorial control have been 
enforced by drug trafficking gangs and paramilitary groups during the COVID-19 
epidemic in the city of Rio de Janeiro. Their results indicate that neighborhoods 
with a strong presence of drug gangs have had fewer casualties attributable to 
COVID-19 than have neighborhoods where the government has de facto control. By 
contrast, COVID-19-related deaths have been higher in neighborhoods controlled by 
paramilitary groups. Bruce et  al. (2020) interpret their results in light of the fact 
that militias’ profits are likely more affected by restriction orders, while drug gangs’ 
profits depend little on the income of the population living in the areas under their 
control. Hence, the opportunity cost of implementing social-distance measures has 
been higher for militias than for drug gangs.
The provision of illegal governance is at the center also of the study by Gomez 
(2020), which focuses on Colombia and Mexico. Gomez (2020) reports differ-
ent episodes of provision of illegal governance (e.g., distribution of food, money, 
medicines, face masks, organization of checkpoints) by OCGs in the periphery of 
Medellín and in several areas of Mexico. The study underlines how criminal groups 
have been more effective than the public institutions in providing solution to local 
communities and reflects on the severe impact that this fact may have on the legiti-
macy of the legal governments of the two countries.
Whether the COVID-19 pandemic has had any effect on the activities of drug-
trafficking organizations in Mexico City is, instead, the research interest of Balmori 
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de la Miyar et al. (2021) and colleagues. To proxy OCGs’ activities, they focus on 
kidnapping, homicides, and extortions while the study does not investigate neither 
illegal governance nor infiltration of the legal economy. Their event-study analy-
sis indicates no effect on kidnapping and homicides. The rate of extortions also did 
not change during the first seven weeks of observation; then, it declined in weeks 
eight and ten. The result then suggests that OCGs in Mexico City maintained similar 
activity levels during the pandemic.
Finally, on the basis of content analysis of legal acts, strategic documents, aca-
demic papers, media reporting, official documents, and interviews with police offic-
ers and representatives of civil society organizations, Djordjević and Dobovšek 
(2020) have investigated how COVID-19 has impacted crime and crime-fighting in 
the Western Balkans. The authors show that, in the first nine weeks of the spread 
of COVID-19, the Western Balkans experienced a small rise in the price of can-
nabis, ecstasy, and amphetamines, which remained available; by contrast, the supply 
of heroin decreased. The impact of COVID-19 on human trafficking in the area was, 
instead, hard to establish.
The foregoing review of the available academic studies on OC and COVID-19 
indicates that empirical attention to OCGs’ provision of illegal governance has been 
marginal, whilst OC’s infiltration of the legal economy has not yet been investigated. 
Moreover, studies analyzing OCGs’ reactions to the pandemic are few, which leaves 
several issues open for exploration. In particular, those regarding the groups that 
have exploited the opportunities given by COVID-19, and the means they have used 
to provide illegal governance and infiltrate the legal economy. Against this back-
ground, the aim of the current study is to investigate what kind of opportunities does 
the COVID-19 outbreak offer to OC, and what strategies do OCGs use to exploit 
them.
While most criminal groups are relatively small, flexible, and engage in illegal 
activities for monetary gains, others seek to also exercise influence on the communities 
of which they are part (Paoli and Vander Beken 2014). Five organizations, often 
labeled ‘mafia-type OCGs’, are classic examples of the latter form of OC. They are 
the Russian Mafia of the 1990s, the Italian Cosa Nostra and ‘ndrangheta, the yakuza 
in Japan, and the Triads in China (Lo and Kwok 2017; Reuter and Paoli 2020; Varese 
2014). These OCGs do not merely exploit the weaknesses of states; instead, by 
enacting or performing state-like activities and privatizing the provision of services, 
they also acquire a political component (Arias 2006; Gambetta 1993). Most powerful 
Mexican drug-trafficking organizations, Neapolitan Camorra, as well as structured 
criminal organizations in Brazil, Colombian, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nigeria, and the 
United Kingdom, also exert control over their territories, albeit to a lesser extent and 
with limited governance capability (Arias 2006; Aziani et  al. 2020a; Brophy 2008; 
Campana and Varese 2018; Cruz 2010; Reuter and Paoli 2020).
In their study on non-state governance in Sub-Saharan Africa, Raeymaekers et al. 
(2008) observe that crises, although destructive, can bring opportunities and change, 
creating new emergent orders once the situation has stabilized. This may be the case 
of COVID-19 and governance-type OCGs. The medical, economic, and social dis-
array caused by the pandemic creates the possibility for OCGs to strengthen their 
local political influence. Because criminal governance relies on the relation and 
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interaction between the (absence of the) state and OCGs, the difficulties faced by 
Governments in mitigating the negative impact of the pandemic may favor OCGs. 
Indeed, irrespectively of its providers, when governance is perceived as fair and 
effective, it can acquire legitimacy (Felbab-Brown 2017; Lessing and Willis 2019). 
In turn, greater legitimacy brings direct benefits for OCGs (e.g., greater acceptance 
of protection payments) and eventually supports them in their competition with legal 
institutions for state-making (Aziani et al. 2020b; Felbab-Brown 2017). Conversely, 
we expect to find at most few incidents referring to less stable criminal organiza-
tions/collaborations or inward-looking criminal groups which neither aspire to nor 
are capable of performing forms of illegal governance in response to the COVID-19 
epidemic.
Besides governance ambitions, criminal organizations have also the need and the 
capacity to infiltrate the legal economy in different ways for the purposes of launder-
ing the proceeds of their illegal activities, logistically supporting those activities, 
and expanding their sources of income (Levi and Soudijn 2020; Paoli and Vander 
Beken 2014; Savona et al. 2016; Savona and Riccardi 2015). The COVID-19 pan-
demic provides OCGs with new opportunities to expand their infiltration. Indeed, 
the crisis has exposed numerous businesses to a severe shortage of capital. In the 
absence of sufficient and ready-to-obtain public subsidies, these businesses may be 
at greater risk of criminal infiltration (Stephany et al. 2020). More fragile economies 
are those where we expect OC infiltration to be higher because less solid companies 
and businesses operating in the grey economy have greater difficulties in obtaining 
loans from legitimate financial institutions. The banking system may not be able 
and willing to support struggling businesses because of increased systemic risk as 
well as their specific risk of loan default. On the other hand, OCGs can compen-
sate for the higher risks because of the high liquidity at their disposal, often lent 
with usurious interest rates, and they can be more effective than legitimate financial 
institutions in debt recovery by trespassing the boundaries of legality (Lavezzi 2014; 
Scaglione 2014).
Opportunities have arisen not only in the private sector. By relying on corrup-
tion practices and political connections, OC may indeed infiltrate public procure-
ment in order to illicitly obtain public funds (Caneppele et al. 2009; Pinotti 2015). 
Specifically, observation of past socio-economic crises shows that a large number of 
OCGs have been able to appropriate recovery funds, stimulus packages, and other 
public subsidies (Fukushima 1995; Monzini 1999). For example, this has frequently 
been the case of earthquakes in Southern Italy (e.g., those in Belice in 1968, Irpinia 
in 1980 or Abruzzo in 2009). On those occasions, Cosa Nostra, the Camorra and 
other OCGs took advantage of reconstruction works to obtain public procurements 
and subsidies, and to strengthen their grip on local businesses and markets (Monzini 
1999; Parrinello 2013; Riccardi et al. 2016). This is of importance because already 
in the first month of the pandemic, the distress caused by the spread of the virus and 
by the social distancing measures induced the governments of several countries to 
plan unprecedented injections of liquidity into their economies (Rizwan et al. 2020). 
Two are the main contributing factors to the risk of embezzlement: the sheer amount 
of disbursements and the need for rapid action. The latter, in particular, may result 
in relaxed scrutiny on the use of funds. Urgency, in fact, may hinder the ability of 
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governments to devise and activate proper public procurement policies, thus increas-
ing the risk of criminal misappropriations.
In accordance with the previous literature on OC, we expect to find evidence 
of the ability of most structured groups to misappropriate public funds on a large 
scale by taking advantage of the massive injection of liquidity in the global eco-
nomic system induced by COVID-19. On the other hand, we expect to find little to 
no evidence indicating that unstructured groups and criminal enterprises are able to 
infiltrate the legal economy and misappropriate of public funds. Indeed, as observed 
by von Lampe and Blokland (2020) with respect to criminal outlaw motorcycle 
clubs, unlike governance-type OCGs, less structured criminal groups have limited 
capacities to misappropriate of public funds due to their lack of connections in the 
upper-world.
Methodology
The methodology implemented in our analysis was intended to find exemplificative 
cases of OCGs reaction to the COVID-19 situation that would serve to reconstruct 
how some groups have adapted to the new reality with respect to illegal governance, 
infiltration of the legal economy, and illicit appropriation of public funds. Data were 
first identified and collected through a systematic assessment of relevant information 
from two main sources: (1) articles by the media and (2) reports by international 
organizations. Our assessment of pertinent cases and events published by the media 
relied on international, national, and local newspapers and reports stored in the larg-
est available digital repositories and personalized news aggregators, including the 
Lexis Nexis® Metabase platform and Google News. We also consulted media out-
lets and investigative journalists’ sources, such as the Organised Crime and Cor-
ruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) and InSight Crime. Analysis of official reports 
was based on public releases made by relevant organizations, including INTER-
POL, Federal Agency for Medicines and Health Products (FAMHP), and Guardia di 
Finanza (Italy).
The data-gathering process began with the automatic identification and extraction 
of media articles and official releases using different sets of keywords and queries 
relating to the topic of OC and COVID-19 over the eight-month period January-
August 2020. While media and international organizations have published many 
articles and reports during this time, most of them are of a speculative nature or 
are general commentaries, hence do not report tangible evidence. Consequently, we 
had to filter out only those instances where actual cases were addressed. In order to 
collect as much information as possible and to avoid double counting, we further tri-
angulated information corroborating the details of an article with information from 
other sources referring to the same event. Then, a manual recognition of factual evi-
dence was performed, along with classification of the identified information into 
the various categories of criminal behavior examined in this study (i.e., provision 
of illegal governance, infiltration of the legal economy, misappropriation of public 
funds). A criminal event was not always classified in a single class since an event 
may be related to several of the criminal behaviors mentioned above. For instance, 
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infiltration of the legal economy may occur simultaneously with the misappropria-
tion of public funds or with the involvement of illegal governance activities.
As result, we were able to identify 29 distinctive instances of exploitation of the 
COVID-19 crisis by OCGs through illegal governance and/or infiltration of the legal 
economy. The news items and official reports analyzed were articles in English (14), 
Spanish (9), Italian (3), and Portuguese (3), which were retrieved from 21 sources 
scanned over 85,000 sources worldwide.1 The identified cases made reference to the 
strategies implemented by different criminal groups, including the distribution of 
products (medical products, sanitary items, food, and essential products), imposition 
of movement restrictions (on vehicles, local residents, and tourists), price control of 
primary goods, closure of businesses, trafficking of medical and sanitary products, 
and misappropriation of public funds (more details in Table 1). The events did not 
distribute evenly over time since we observed more cases reported in the two-month 
period from the end of March to the beginning of May (Fig. 1).
Limitations
The main limitation of the methodology employed is associated with the non-ran-
dom nature of the sample of identified OC activities. It is well acknowledged that 
news media decision makers often rely on their own criteria when deciding whether 
or not to publish a story, as well as the narrative behind it (Chermak 1995). More-
over, media attention to OCGs may differ among countries and regions because 
criminal activities are perceived and reported differently in different contexts. As 
such, strategies of the medias may introduce a bias towards more sensationalist and 
serious crimes, perhaps committed by notorious mafia-type organizations, as edito-
rial staffs might consider them more newsworthy than less serious offences, perhaps 
committed by little known criminal enterprises. Related to this, it may be the case 
that certain episodes not reported so far will be exposed in the future, depending 
on the ability of law enforcement agencies to detect them. While there is anecdo-
tal proof suggesting that, for instance, the illegal acquisition of recovery funds and 
public subsidies may have increased in some countries (see e.g., DIA 2021, in Italy), 
there is no strong evidence to determine whether or not OCGs are able to infiltrate 
or to increase their governance during this period of crisis. Nevertheless, this is not 
something new in the study of OCGs.
Many authors have stressed the great difficulty of empirically assess and meas-
ure OC, mainly because of its ill-definition (Kleemans 2014), and the endogenous 
error of crime reporting (Pinotti 2020). The first refers to the vast variety of OC 
definitions as some researchers concentrate on long-establish organizations, some 
on complex and transnational groups, and others on local illegal markets. The sec-
ond point relates to the fact that enforcement and official data will rarely reflect a 
comprehensive picture of OC activities, even in jurisdictions where enforcement and 
1 A language bias may have been present because we employed a limited number of languages; for 
example, no news items in Japanese, Chinese, Arabic, or other Asian languages were scanned and 
retrieved.
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mitigating measures are effective—i.e., a low level of crime related to OC could be 
a good sign indicating a low level of criminal activity, or it could be a bad sign indi-
cating a low rate of detection.
However, the aim of our analysis was not to assess the extent to which both illegal 
governance and infiltration in the legal economy have increased or changed; but, 
instead, to find empirical evidence on whether these two dynamics have occurred 
and if so, how. Therefore, we find value in the use of media sources for the identifi-
cation of relevant cases as they provide evidence on OC activities that occur in many 
different places and that are often not reported to and by authorities. However, we 
avoided making claims on criminal patterns or trends, as they extend beyond what 
we can support with the collected data, and instead concentrated on the qualitative 
assessment of the identified articles.
Results
Governance
The strict lockdowns imposed by governments worldwide have sought to control and 
manage the health crisis. These measures have resulted in an economic downturn 
which has imposed stress on individuals and businesses alike (Nicola et al. 2020). 
Moreover, in numerous countries, the socio-economic instability has exposed two 
weaknesses of governing authorities: their slow, and often inadequate, economic 
assistance; and their difficulties in enforcing widespread lockdowns (Bonacini et  al. 
2021; Campedelli and D’Orsogna 2021). The review of cases suggests that numerous 
OCGs have attempted to exploit these weaknesses to obtain, maintain or increase 
their social legitimacy. Some OCGs, indeed, have engaged in multiple actions 
aimed at building consensus, strengthening their control over specific territories, 
and consolidating their bonds with local people. Overall, from the analysis of the 
Fig. 1  Temporal distribution of identified cases
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identified cases, the means with which OCGs have tried to exert and expand their 
governance role during the pandemic can be classified into two broad categories. 
First, these groups have provided sustenance and facilitated access to resources that 
people need—e.g., food parcels, sanitary products, toilet paper, tissues. Second, they 
have imposed and enforced lockdown measures to halt the spread of the virus.
The provision of different arrangements of economic relief emerged as the most 
frequently reported governance strategy adopted by OCGs during the first months 
of the pandemic. The cases by the media account for different tactics, such as the 
distribution of groceries, the delivery of sanitary products, but also price controls 
and outright cash handouts. Food and primary goods have been distributed by Cosa 
Nostra and Camorra affiliates in the Italian cities of Palermo and Naples, sometimes 
exploiting fake charity organizations set up specifically for the purpose (Crimaldi 
2020; Palazzolo 2020). Members of rival gangs in South Africa’s capital Cape Town 
have made truce and agreed on laying down their weapons to distribute food par-
cels and primary goods (Kennedy 2020). Similarly, members of numerous drug traf-
ficking organizations in the Mexican states of Jalisco, San Luis Potosí, Veracruz, 
Michoacán, Tamaulipas, Guerrero, and the State of Mexico supplied bundles con-
taining food and sanitizers to the states and cities under their influence (Agencia 
EFE 2020; Economìa Hoy 2020; Hyman 2020; La Opinión 2020a, b, c).
A second type of handout has consisted in the distribution of sanitary equipment 
like face masks, hand sanitizer and soap, as done by gang members affiliated to 
the Comando Vermelho operating in the favelas of western Rio de Janeiro and by 
yakuza members in Japan (Barretto Briso and Phillips 2020; Cerantola 2020; Ríos 
and Sapalú 2020). Some OCGs in Latin America have provided not only in-kind 
contributions; gang members of Barrio 18 in Guatemala City have suspended extor-
tion payments, while gangs in Brazil have made outright cash handouts and pre-
vented speculations, halting increases in the prices of basic necessities (Leitão and 
Martins 2020; Ríos and Sapalú 2020; Walsh et al. 2020).
OCG governance activities have also included the imposition and the enforce-
ment of social distancing measures, and the performance of other policing activities 
in some cases by threatening residents with reprisals and violence. Several Brazil-
ian gangs, some of them belonging to the aforementioned Comando Vermelho, have 
prohibited tourists from entering the favelas in Rio de Janeiro while also imposing 
the closure of shops (Barsetti 2020; Blois 2020). In the Morro dos Prazeres, citizens 
have been ordered to avoid circulating in groups larger than two. In Rocinha traffick-
ers have imposed a curfew, while in Complexo da Maré they have ordered churches 
to reduce their operating hours (Barretto Briso and Phillips 2020). Similarly, gangs 
in Venezuela and El Salvador have enforced government-mandated lockdowns and 
restricted public gatherings in the territories under their control (El Nacional 2020; 
Martínez et al. 2020). While gang members in Brazil have enforced social distancing 
measures in response to the government’s lack of action, members of the Colectivo 
Tupamaro in Caracas, and of Mara Salvatrucha-13 and Barrio 18 in San Salvador, 
have enforced government-mandated lockdowns in and nearby controlled territories 
(Barretto Briso and Phillips 2020; El Nacional 2020; Martínez et al. 2020).
Not all OCGs, however, have been reported to be involved in illicit govern-
ance activities. We found no evidence, for instance, with respect to street gangs or 
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motorcycle gangs in the United States and Australia, or trafficking networks in any 
region. Instead, we found cases of other criminal insurgency non-state entities that 
did engage in governance activities. Fighters from the dissident  29th Front of the 
ex-FARC in Colombia, the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham 
in Syria have all engaged in policing activities, enforcing quarantine measures and 
restricting public gatherings (Sieff et al. 2020; TuBarco 2020). Some, like the Tali-
ban and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, have gone as far as substituting the government in 
providing basic health care services to locals by sending health teams to remote 
communities, distributing health information, and performing door-to-door tempera-
ture checks (Jackson 2020; Sieff et al. 2020).
Many of the identified governance activities performed by OCGs and other ille-
gal organizations have involved blatant acts designed to ensure that the locals knew 
who the ‘benefactors’ were. Although OCGs mainly seek approval and legitimacy 
in the territories under their control, some of these activities have been directed 
towards a larger audience, possibly in an effort to extend their reputational reach. 
Social media have played a key role in this process, with several groups advertis-
ing their actions through videos and pictures. Mexican drug-trafficking syndicates, 
indeed, have posted images of the distribution of food parcels displaying their logo 
(Economìa Hoy 2020; Ernst 2020; Jorgic 2020; La Opinión 2020a). For instance, 
the Cártel del Golfo printed the ‘CDG’ logo on the packages it delivered or sealed 
them with stickers that read: “Gulf Cartel, in support of Ciudad Victoria, Mr. 46, 
Vaquero” being Mr. 46 the pseudonym of the leader of the Cártel del Golfo group 
that operates in Matamoros (Sieff et al. 2020; Torres 2020). The Cártel de Sinaloa, 
the Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación, and Los Viagras posted online videos in 
which their members distributed bags of groceries (Keyser 2020; Torres 2020).2 In 
a similar fashion, the yakuza have secured indirect exposure through news outlets by 
offering to disinfect the Diamond Princess,3 a cruise ship at the center of both the 
national and international debate concerning the pandemic (Cerantola 2020).
Infiltration of the economy
Analysis of the cases found in the media and official reports shows that the COVID-
19 emergency has provided new opportunities for OCGs to infiltrate the legal econ-
omy. The available evidence indicates that infiltration has occurred in the running 
of businesses involved in the sale of health products, the misappropriation of med-
ical funds, and the embezzlement of economic stimulus packages. The economic 
sector identified as being most vulnerable to and exploited by criminal infiltration 
2 The news article by Jorgic (2020), Keyser (2020), Torres (2020) present the same events as described 
in other news articles reported in Table  1; they are used as a reference because they provide a more 
detailed description of the use of social media and other promotional activities by Mexican drug-traf-
ficking organizations. However, these news articles were not added to Table 1 in order to avoid double-
counting issues and maintain an accurate account of the events.
3 The Diamond Princess was a cruise ship which docked and quarantined in the port of Yokohama on 4 
February 2020. Between 20 January and 1 March, 712 passengers tested positive for the virus, resulting 
in 14 casualties.
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during the first phase of the COVID-19 outbreak was wholesale trade in medical 
and pharmaceutical products. In this case, OCGs were able to benefit along the 
entire ‘spectrum’ of possible activities, ranging from illicit ones, like the manufac-
turing and marketing of counterfeit product, to licit ones, like the acquisition and 
establishment of fully legitimate firms (e.g. ones active in the wholesale of medical 
devices, masks, pharmaceuticals), or their use as covers for illicit trafficking (Smith 
1980). Operation Pangea XIII has accounted for this reality, which has been coor-
dinated by Interpol and involved police, customs and health regulatory authorities 
from 90 countries (INTERPOL 2020a), resulting in 121 arrests worldwide and the 
seizure of many dangerous pharmaceuticals and medical products. Other cases of 
large-scale distribution of counterfeit and defective pharmaceutical products have 
been reported by law enforcement agencies in several European countries, such as 
Romania (OCCRP 2020a), the United Kingdom (Brignall 2020), Belgium (FAMHP 
2020) and Lithuania (OCCRP 2020b), with the latter exhibiting proven connections 
to Romanian organized crime. The fact that some seized pharmaceutical products 
were counterfeit suggests that there is an ongoing hybridization of infiltration in the 
international distribution and actual trafficking of illicit goods within the medical 
environment.
Our analysis also allowed us to identify cases of misuse of public funds intended 
both to support medical needs and to stimulate the economic system. These included 
cases of corruption in the procurement process whereby funds intended for pro-
tective equipment for COVID-19 were misappropriated and transferred to a well-
known OC member in Slovenia (OCCRP 2020c). In addition, we have found a case 
of a massive fraud scheme coupled with money laundering concerning the supply of 
10 million face masks worth €15 million in which German health authorities were 
scammed by criminal groups who orchestrated a complex chain of referrals between 
suppliers in Spain, Ireland and the Netherlands (INTERPOL 2020b). Finally, the 
analyses highlighted a case of embezzlement of Italian COVID-19 funds in which 
economic relief packages valued at €45,000 were awarded to a ‘ndrangheta member 
through a complex scheme of tax fraud, false invoices and fake names within the 
steel trade sector (Guardia di Finanza 2020). As said, it is possible that the misap-
propriation of public funds by OCGs has increased starting after the studied period, 
since most recovery-plans were authorized and officially implemented only in the 
last months of 2020.
The media debate on the possibility of OC infiltration in sectors weakened by the 
pandemic has been vast (Agenpress 2020; Dellasega and Vorrath 2020). The rapid 
surge in demand in specific sectors is what made them particularly attractive for 
speculators. Sectors such as the health care, logistics and e-commerce all boomed 
due to the health crises and lockdown measures; the food retail trade and cleaning 
services grew because of disinfestation requirements introduced in most countries; 
waste management and funeral services expanded due to the increased mortal-
ity. Other sectors, on the other hand, became vulnerable due to financial distress. 
These include tourism, hospitality, transportation, beauty salons, arts and entertain-
ment, and recreation. Nevertheless, we found no official cases of infiltration to sup-
port these speculations except for the aforementioned wholesale trade of medical 
and pharmaceutical products. Again, evidence may emerge in the second phase of 
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the pandemic when ongoing and future investigations may bring forth significant 
evidence.
Discussion
The analysis performed indicates that several criminal syndicates exploited the 
spread of COVID-19 in the first phase of the pandemic to show themselves as pro-
viders of governance and to benefit either in terms of power or profit from their infil-
tration of the legal economy. There is evidence with respect to five dynamics: the 
provision of goods in high demand; the imposition of social-distancing measures; 
the deferral of the collection of protection payments from local businesses; the infil-
tration of industries, which the crisis made more lucrative; the misappropriation of 
funds intended to mitigate the impact of social distancing on economies. In the first 
eight months after the spread of SARS-CoV-2, illegal governance activities were 
more commonly reported by the news than activities related to infiltration of legal 
economy and misappropriation of public funds. On the one hand, this result might 
emerge because governance activities may take place prior to episodes of infiltration 
in the legal economy. Enforcing social distancing or providing food to communities 
experiencing hardship requires little planning or organization. On the other hand, 
illegal governance measures are more public and explicit than attempts to infiltrate 
the legal economy, as the Mexican cases exemplify. As such, they are also more 
likely to be reported by media and institutional reports.
Not all forms of OCGs have been found to engage in these actions of govern-
ance. In line with the theoretical expectation that the differences in activities per-
formed by OCGs depend on their nature, our empirical results provide evidence on 
some mafia-type OCGs exploiting COVID-19 to affirm themselves as providers of 
illegal governance. In this regard, Cosa Nostra and Camorra groups in Sicily and 
Campania or Yamaguchi-Gumi in Yokohama supply the population with sanitizers 
or food, as well as proposing themselves as providers of other forms of economic 
support. Members of the Comando Vermelho have imposed price controls on goods 
in high demand because of the pandemic; at the same time, they have imposed and 
enforced stay-at-home restrictions on the people living in some favelas under their 
influence. Even if the popular legitimacy of the Comando Vermelho is often ephem-
eral, this behavior aligns with previous cases of leaders of gangs belonging to the 
organization who have spent considerable sums of money on benevolent actions, or 
provided security governance to the favelas where they are based (Reuter and Paoli 
2020). Conversely, although authors such as Lessing and Willis (2019) show that the 
Primeiro Comando da Capital originating in Sao Paulo provides illegal governance, 
the group was not explicitly mentioned in any specific case. This difference, how-
ever, may be a byproduct of the bias in the methodology presented in earlier sections 
Indeed, sources often referred to ‘gangs’ and ‘gang members’ in general without 
providing enough details on the matter. Hence, affiliations were not always explicit 
and clear. Although the evidence presented in this papers is exploratory and crimi-
nal groups are heterogeneous—e.g., South African gangs and Cosa Nostra—, the 
results indicate that support for people in need and the imposition of common rules 
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during the pandemic have been performed mainly by OCGs with pre-existing politi-
cal power and/or connection with the local population. Whether this is driven by the 
desire to acquire greater economic and organizational capabilities, or to increase the 
organization’s power within the community remains to be investigated by further 
studies.
By contrast, no evidence was found on illicit governance enforced by criminal 
groups not strongly rooted in their territory before the pandemic. No reports, indeed, 
account for the involvement of youth gangs, outlaw motorcycle gangs, and traffick-
ing networks in forms of illegal governance in the aftermath of the pandemic. This 
may be due to the fact that youth gangs, for instance, are mainly focused on their 
members and are not used to reaching outside their groups (Lafontaine et al. 2009; 
Soliz and Rittenour 2012). Consequently, a change in the social landscape does not 
drive them towards a greater role in the in the community and political environment, 
nor pushes them to become multifunctional in reaction to the crisis. These findings 
align with those by Kim and Phillips (2021), who observed a significant increase in 
gang-related gun violence in Buffalo, New York, following the COVID-19 outbreak, 
and further interpreted it in light of increased strain on gang members. Kim and 
Phillips (2021) argue that the pandemic has led to an unprecedented increase in the 
unemployment rate, especially for poor individuals in the inner city, which in turn 
has led to an increase in gun violence. This dynamic clearly contrasts with the one 
of powerful groups organizing actions to support people in need in a showy way. 
A similar line of reasoning may apply to outlaw motorcycle gangs and trafficking 
networks, as these organizations already lacked the incentives and means to provide 
governance before of the turmoil caused by COVID-19 (von Lampe and Blokland 
2020).
It is plausible that the provision of goods in high demand is primarily intended to 
strengthen bonds with the local population while discrediting legitimate institutions, 
highlighting the inability on national and local government to help the community. 
The endeavor by some OCGs to give visibility to their donations supports this inter-
pretation; OCGs seek to maximize their audiences, thus obtaining higher returns 
on their investments. Likewise, by enforcing lockdowns and stay-at-home orders, 
OCGs try to propose themselves as socially legitimated governing institutions. All 
these actions are functional to obtaining a bottom-up legitimization. The only excep-
tion found in the collected sample is the attempt by the yakuza to be recognized as a 
legitimate interlocutor by the Japanese government by offering to sanitize the cruise 
ship blocked in Yokohama. Nevertheless, the yakuza did not achieve this form of 
top-down legitimacy because the Japanese government refused its offer.
Additionally, expansion of governance in this turbulent period may facilitate infil-
tration of the legal economy. In fact, the two dynamics are not always clearly sepa-
rated since one can accompany and serve the other (Savona et al. 2016; Riccardi 2014; 
Campana and Varese 2018). Infiltration of firms and the legal economy at large, mis-
appropriation and misuse of public funds, and criminal governance are interconnected. 
For mafia-type OCGs, a greater consensus by the local community may turn into 
political support and facilitate control and influence over the local government and, 
in turn, the manipulation of public tenders. In other cases, the link may be simpler 
and more direct. For instance, the provision of loans at very low interest, like the 
 Trends in Organized Crime
1 3
ones provided by Camorra or the Unión Tepito Cartel, may directly create a bond 
between the business owner and the criminal group which is conductive to the later 
acquisition by the OC group of the company’s assets or share capital.
Among the sectors that have been reported to be most vulnerable to criminal 
infiltration during the first phase of the COVID-19 outbreak, the wholesale distri-
bution of medical pharmaceutical products emerged as the main one. This is likely 
due to the sudden increase in demand for these products, which made their trade 
particularly profitable and possibly subject to little scrutiny by public authorities. 
The activity of some OCGs in this sector involves the combined manufacturing and 
trafficking of counterfeit or defective medical devices and pharmaceuticals, and the 
establishment of new legal firms (often used as covers for illicit activities). Whilst 
the identification of targeted sectors is important for safeguarding the integrity of 
legitimate economies, it is essential to identify cases of firms that may be more 
prone to infiltration. If any becomes available, future studies may want to focus 
on the incident level, rather than the structural level. Moreover, whereas we have 
observed the short-term effects, the medium- and long-term ones are also relevant 
and possibly different. As said, recent anecdotal evidence suggests that the misuse 
of public funds by organized crime has expanded with respect to the first phase of 
the pandemic, also because recovery plans have only recently entered into force.
Close attention has been paid to the possibility of OC infiltration in vulnerable 
sectors. Experts on the topic expect that, with the prolongation of the COVID-
19-induced crisis, three main areas will be challenged by infiltration risks: (i) sectors 
made vulnerable by the crisis and hence with financial difficulties, such as tourism, 
hospitality and transport, (ii) sectors made attractive by the crisis, such as health 
care, cleaning, food and logistics, and, finally, (iii) public funds and potential vic-
tims of fraud and money laundering (Dellasega and Vorrath 2020; GITOC 2020b). 
Although we have identified some cases of OC infiltration in the healthcare sector 
and misappropriation of COVID-19 funds, we were unable to bring robust evidence 
in support of OCGs actual capacity to misappropriate public funds intended to sup-
port the recovery of national economies. This may be due to the long-term nature of 
the phenomena considered and to the difficulty encountered by enforcement institu-
tions in gathering enough evidence to carry out comprehensive investigations and 
operations.
Conclusions
This study has explored cases from the media and official releases on the immedi-
ate adaptation of OCGs to the spread of COVID-19 and to the implementation of 
containment and economic-relief policies adopted by governments around the world 
in the first phase of the pandemic. Among the possible changes in OCGs activities, 
we have focused on the provision of illegal governance and on the infiltration of the 
legal economy, since these are dynamics particularly threatening for the functioning 
of societies and legitimate economic systems when crises are in place. The analysis 
of illustrative cases shows evidence on the fact that the COVID-19 emergency has 
affected the behavior of some OCGs by providing them with new opportunities to 
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gain legitimacy and support in the community within which they operate, as well 
as to expand and diversify their investments. Around the world, governance-type 
OCGs have provided relief packages, enforced social distancing, and imposed price 
controls; we have collected no evidence of trafficking networks doing the same. 
Direct evidence of OCGs infiltrating the legal economy is less abundant; nonethe-
less, it exists and it may be expected to become more visible in the medium and 
long term. In the first eight months after the spread of COVID-19, there occurred 
episodes of OCGs trying to exploit the growing demand for medical and pharma-
ceutical products, and to embezzling public funds. These findings are necessarily 
preliminary and exploratory, and they will have to be triangulated and verified once 
official statistics and additional information become available. Nevertheless, they 
furnish insights into dynamics to be considered when devising anti-crime and eco-
nomic-relief policies.
During the pandemic, OCG governance activities have somewhat aligned with 
government interests, highlighting the complexity of the relation between criminal 
governance and legitimate state governance. Rather than necessarily being in imme-
diate opposition to one another, the two can sometimes align, posing additional chal-
lenges for legitimate governing authorities. For instance, a crackdown on OCGs 
enforcing government-mandated lockdowns is difficult to justify in the eyes of citi-
zens, who may deem those actions inconsistent, thus further increasing the distance 
between them and the state. In the long term, however, any legitimization of OCGs 
threatens the health of societies, solidifying the position and status of OCGs in the 
community. It highlights the failures of governments and diminishes their legiti-
macy, ultimately making it easier for OCGs to continue their activities in the future 
and to swell their ranks.
Illicit governance, infiltration of the legal economy, and the embezzlement of 
public funds should not be compartmentalized and treated as three unrelated dynam-
ics. Policy-makers, in fact, should design policies which take account of the inter-
connectedness among these elements, carefully evaluating the trade-offs, and find-
ing the balance among them. First, activities of governance and infiltration of the 
legal economy are sometimes similar in form. Because the pandemic has led to both 
individuals and businesses being strapped for cash, some OCGs have had the oppor-
tunity to provide money and resources both to engender loyalty and to acquire shares 
in legal businesses. Second, government-issued stimulus packages entail a trade-
off between the risk of embezzlement, on the one hand, and the risk of infiltration 
and strengthening illicit governance on the other. Sizeable liquidity injections, fis-
cal stimulus, grants, and other funds intended to accelerate economic recovery carry 
an inherent risk of embezzlement. This risk is further exacerbated by the weakened 
institutions, the need for swift interventions and—possibly—relaxed scrutiny and 
insufficient safeguards.
Adequate subsidies, however, are vital for preventing a long and disastrous reces-
sion. Too small and prudent interventions may leave businesses and people on 
the brink of bankruptcy, opening the way for illicit sources of funding. Weakened 
balance sheets and grim prospects concerning future earnings, indeed, are fertile 
ground for OCGs’ infiltration. Unlike the 2008 financial crisis, banks are not in dis-
tress; but the inability of borrowers to provide adequate collateral and the banks’ 
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unwillingness to lend money in a high-risk environment may limit the injection of 
private capitals in the market. OCGs, on the other hand, have illicit ways to coerce 
borrowers into paying back loans or giving up collateral. To conclude, governments 
are faced with the difficult task of striking the right balance between large and swift 
liquidity injections, which may be misappropriated and misused by OCGs, and 
insufficient aid, which may foster infiltration and strengthen the social legitimacy of 
criminal groups.
Funding Open access funding provided by Universita Cattolica del Sacro Cuore within the CRUI-CARE 
Agreement.
Declarations 
Disclosure of potential conflicts of interest The authors certify that they have not received any direct indi-
vidual compensation for any work in the subject matter or materials that is discussed in the paper. To 
produce the paper, none of the authors received any funding.
Research involving human participants and/or animals The research behind this paper did involve neither 
human participants nor animals.
Informed consent The research behind this paper did involve neither human participants nor animals.
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, 
which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as 
you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Com-
mons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article 
are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the 
material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is 
not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission 
directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http:// creat iveco mmons. org/ licen 
ses/ by/4. 0/.
References
Agencia EFE. (2020, April 16). Hija de ‘El Chapó’ Guzmán entrega alimentos con la imagen de su padre. 
El Comercio. http:// www. elcom ercio. com/ actua lidad/ hija- chapo- guzman- despe nsas- coron avirus. 
html. Accessed 22 January 2021
Agenpress. (2020). Covid e infiltrazioni criminali: i nuovi indicatori di anomalia per tutelare le aziende. 
https:// www. agenp ress. it/ 2020/ 05/ 19/ covid-e- infil trazi oni- crimi nali-i- nuovi- indic atori- di- anoma lia- 
per- tutel are- le- azien de/. Accessed 22 July 2020
Arias ED (2006) The Dynamics of Criminal Governance: Networks and Social Order in Rio de Janeiro. J 
Lat Am Stud 38(2):293–325. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1017/ S0022 216X0 60007 21
Ashby MPJ (2020) Initial evidence on the relationship between the coronavirus pandemic and crime in 
the United States. Crime Sci 9(1):6. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1186/ s40163- 020- 00117-6
Aziani A, Favarin S, Campedelli GM (2020a) A Security Paradox. The Influence Of Governance-Type 
Organized Crime Over The Surrounding Criminal Environment. Br J Criminol 60(4):970–993. 
https:// doi. org/ 10. 1093/ bjc/ azz087
Aziani A, Favarin S, Campedelli GM (2020b) Security Governance: Mafia Control over Ordinary 
Crimes. J Res Crime Delinq 57(4):444–492. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1177/ 00224 27819 893417
1 3
Trends in Organized Crime 
Balmori de la Miyar JR Hoehn-Velasco L, Silverio-Murillo A (2021) Druglords don’t stay at home: 
COVID-19 pandemic and crime patterns in Mexico City. Journal of Criminal Justice, 72. https:// 
doi. org/ 10. 1016/j. jcrim jus. 2020. 101745
Barretto Briso C, Phillips T (2020) Brazil gangs impose strict curfews to slow coronavirus spread. The 
Guardian. https:// amp. thegu ardian. com/ world/ 2020/ mar/ 25/ brazil- rio- gangs- coron avirus. Accessed 
22 January 2021
Barsetti S (2020) Coronavírus: Tráfico proíbe turistas em favelas do Rio. Terra. https:// www. terra. com. br/ 
notic ias/ coron avirus/ coron avirus- trafi co- proibe- turis tas- em- favel as- do- rio,fe51c 0a4cb 56352 a96bd 
a95e0 acd64 2amrq lvjve. html. Accessed 22 January 2021
Blois C (2020) Tráfico impõe toque de recolher em favelas do Rio em meio a crise do corona. UOL. 
https:// notic ias. uol. com. br/ cotid iano/ ultim as- notic ias/ 2020/ 03/ 24/ coron avirus- facco es- do- trafi co- 
impoem- toque- de- recol her- em- favel as- do- rj. htm. Accessed 22 January 2021
Bonacini L, Gallo G, Patriarca F (2021) Identifying policy challenges of COVID-19 in hardly reliable 
data and judging the success of lockdown measures. J Popul Econ 34(1):275–301. https:// doi. org/ 
10. 1007/ s00148- 020- 00799-x
Brignall M (2020) Huge rise in fake goods and scams amid coronavirus lockdown, say UK councils. The 
Guardian. http:// www. thegu ardian. com/ uk- news/ 2020/ may/ 09/ huge- rise- in- fake- goods- and- scams- 
amid- coron avirus- lockd own- say- uk- counc ils. Accessed 20 January 2021
Brophy S (2008) Mexico: Cartels, corruption and cocaine: A profile of the Gulf cartel. Global Crime 
9(3):248–261
Bruce R, Cavgias A, Meloni L (2020) Filling the Void? Organized Crime and COVID-19 in Rio De 
Janeiro (SSRN Scholarly Paper No. ID 3678840). Social Science Research Network, Rochester, 
NY. https:// doi. org/ 10. 2139/ ssrn. 36788 40
Campana P, Varese F (2018) Organized Crime in the United Kingdom: Illegal Governance of Markets 
and Communities. Br J Criminol 58(6):1381–1400
Campedelli GM, D’Orsogna MR (2021) Temporal clustering of disorder events during the COVID-19 
pandemic. PLoS ONE 16(4):1–27. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1371/ journ al. pone. 02504 33
Campedelli GM, Favarin S, Aziani A, Piquero AR (2020) Disentangling community-level changes in 
crime trends during the COVID-19 pandemic in Chicago. Crime Sci 9(1):21. https:// doi. org/ 10. 
1186/ s40163- 020- 00131-8
Caneppele S, Calderoni F, Martocchia S (2009) Not only banks: Criminological models on the infiltration 
of public contracts by Italian organized crime. Journal of Money Laundering Control 12(2):151–
172. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1108/ 13685 20091 09519 10
Cerantola A (2020) Japanese Gangs Vie for Power Amid Pandemic. OCCRP. https:// www. occrp. org/ en/ 
coron avirus/ japan ese- gangs- vie- for- power- amid- pande mic. Accessed 22 January 2021
Chermak SM (1995) Victims in the News: Crime and the American News Media. Office of Justice Pro-
grams. https:// www. ojp. gov/ ncjrs/ virtu al- libra ry/ abstr acts/ victi ms- news- crime- and- ameri can- news- 
media. Accessed 22 May 2021
Crimaldi G (2020) Coronavirus a Napoli, il welfare della camorra arriva in Parlamento: «Il Viminale 
pronto a intervenire». Il Mattino. https:// www. ilmat tino. it/ napoli/ polit ica/ coron avirus_ a_ napoli_ il_ 
welfa re_ della_ camor ra_ in_ parla mento- 51750 00. html. Accessed 22 January 2021
Cruz JM (2010) Central American maras: from youth street gangs to transnational protection rackets. 
Global Crime 11(4):379–398. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1080/ 17440 572. 2010. 519518
Dellasega M Vorrath J (2020) A Gangster’s Paradise? Transnational Organised Crime in the Covid-19 
Pandemic. SWP Comment, December(66), 1–8. https:// doi. org/ 10. 18449/ 2020C 66
DIA (2021) Relazione del Ministro dell’Interno al Parlamento sull’attività svolta e sui risultati con-
seguiti dalla Direzione Investigativa Antimafia - Gennaio/Giungo 2020 (Biannual No. 1). Roma: 
Ministero dell’Interno. https:// direz ionei nvest igati vaant imafia. inter no. gov. it/ semes trali/ sem/ 2020/ 
1sem2 020. pdf
Djordjević S, Dobovšek B (2020) Organised crime in Western Balkans Six at the onset of coronavirus. 
Int J Sociol Soc Policy 40(9/10):807–820. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1108/ IJSSP- 06- 2020- 0229
Economìa Hoy (2020) Reportan entrega de despensas del Cártel del Golfo en Ciudad Victoria, Tamauli-
pas. Economìa Hoy. https:// www. econo miahoy. mx/ nacio nal- eAm- mx/ notic ias/ 10466 405/ 04/ 
20/ Repor tan- entre ga- de- despe nsas- del- Cartel- del- Golfo- en- Ciudad- Victo ria- Tamau lipas. html. 
Accessed 22 January 2021
El Nacional (2020) Tupamaros aseguran que el coronavirus ya llegó al 23 de Enero. El Nacional. https:// 
www. elnac ional. com/ venez uela/ video- tupam aros- asegu ran- que- el- coron avirus- ya- llego- al- 23- de- 
enero/. Accessed 22 January 2021
 Trends in Organized Crime
1 3
Ernst F (2020) Mexican criminal groups see Covid-19 crisis as opportunity to gain more power. The 
Guardian. https:// www. thegu ardian. com/ world/ 2020/ apr/ 20/ mexico- crimi nal- groups- covid- 19- cri-
sis- oppor tunity- gain- power. Accessed 30 April 2020
FAMHP (2020) Coronavirus: the FAMHP seizes postal packages containing counterfeit and other illegal 
medicinal products against COVID-19. FAMHP. https:// www. famhp. be/ en/ news/ coron avirus_ the_ 
famhp_ seizes_ postal_ packa ges_ conta ining_ count erfeit_ and_ other_ illeg al_ medic inal. Accessed 30 
April 2020
Felbab-Brown V (2017) Organized Crime, Illicit Economies, Civil Violence & International Order: More 
Complex Than You Think. Daedalus 146(4):98–111. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1162/ DAED_a_ 00462
Fukushima GS (1995) The Great Hanshin earthquake. JPRI  Occas Pap, (2).  http:// www. jpri. org/ publi 
catio ns/ occas ional papers/ op2. html. Accessed 29 Jan 2021
Gambetta D (1993) The Sicilian Mafia. The business of private protection, 1st edn. Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge - London
Gerell M, Kardell J, Kindgren J (2020) Minor covid-19 association with crime in Sweden. Crime Sci 
9(1):19. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1186/ s40163- 020- 00128-3
GITOC (2020a) Crime and Contagion: The impact of a pandemic on organized crime. https:// globa linit 
iative. net/ crime- conta gion- impact- covid- crime/. Accessed 26 May 2020
GITOC (2020b) Crisis and opportunity: Impacts of the coronavirus pandemic on illicit drug markets. 
Global Initiative. https:// globa linit iative. net/ coron avirus- illic it- drug- marke ts/. Accessed 27 May 
2020
Gomez CT (2020) Organised Crime Governance in Times of Pandemic: The Impact of COVID-19 on Gangs and 
Drug Cartels in Colombia and Mexico. Bull Lat Am Res 39(S1):12–15. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1111/ blar. 13171
Guardia di Finanza (2020) Tratti in arresto otto soggetti in odore di ‘ndrangheta appartenenti ad asso-
ciazione a delinquere di stampo mafioso — gdf.gov.it. http:// www. gdf. gov. it/ stampa/ ultime- notiz ie/ 
anno- 2020/ luglio/ tratti- in- arres to- otto- sogge tti- in- odore- di- 2018n drang heta- appar tenen ti- ad- assoc 
iazio ne-a- delin quere- di- stampo- mafio so# null. Accessed 20 January 2021
Hagan FE (1983) The Organized Crime Continuum: A Further Specification of a New Conceptual Model. 
Crim Justice Rev 8(2):52–57. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1177/ 07340 16883 00800 209
Hyman A (2020) How organised crime is exploiting Covid-19. Times Live. https:// www. times live. co. za/ 
news/ south- africa/ 2020- 04- 18- how- organ ised- crime- is- explo iting- covid- 19/. Accessed 22 January 
2021
INTERPOL (2020a) Global operation sees a rise in fake medical products related to COVID-19. https:// 
www. inter pol. int/ News- and- Events/ News/ 2020/ Global- opera tion- sees-a- rise- in- fake- medic al- produ 
cts- relat ed- to- COVID- 19. Accessed 20 January 2021
INTERPOL (2020b) Unmasked: International COVID-19 fraud exposed. https:// www. inter pol. int/ News- 
and- Events/ News/ 2020/ Unmas ked- Inter natio nal- COVID- 19- fraud- expos ed. Accessed 20 January 
2021
Jackson A (2020) For the Taliban, the Pandemic Is a Ladder. Foreign Policy. https:// forei gnpol icy. com/ 
2020/ 05/ 06/ talib an- afgha nistan- coron avirus- pande mic/. Accessed 25 January 2021
Jorgic D (2020) El Chapo’s daughter, Mexican cartels hand out coronavirus aid. Reuters. https:// www. 
reute rs. com/ artic le/ us- health- coron avirus- mexico- carte ls- idUSK BN21Y 3J7. Accessed 22 January 
2021
Kennedy L (2020) Cape Town Gangs Expand Under Cover of COVID-19. The Fifty-Four. https:// thefi 
ftyfo ur. news/ 2020/ 05/ 03/ cape- town- gangs- expand- under- cover- of- covid- 19/. Accessed 22 January 
2021
Keyser Z (2020) As mafia delivers essentials in Italy, cartels distribute food in Mexico - The Jerusalem 
Post. The Jerusalem Post. https:// www. jpost. com/ inter natio nal/ as- mafia- deliv ers- essen tials- in- italy- 
cartel- distr ibutes- food- in- mexico- 625283. Accessed 30 April 2020
Kim D-Y, Phillips SW (2021) When COVID-19 and guns meet: A rise in shootings. J Crim Just 
73:101783. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1016/j. jcrim jus. 2021. 101783
Kleemans ER (2014) Theoretical perspectives on organized crime. In: Paoli L (ed) The Oxford handbook 
of organized crime. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 32–52
La Opinión (2020a) CJNG reparte despensas para ayudar a familias en tiempos del coronavirus. La Opin-
ión. https:// laopi nion. com/ 2020/ 04/ 15/ cjng- repar te- despe nsas- para- ayudar- a- famil ias- en- tiemp os- 
del- coron avirus/. Accessed 24 January 2021
La Opinión (2020b) Ahora Los Zetas reparten despensa. La Opinión. https:// laopi nion. com/ 2020/ 04/ 18/ 
ahora- los- zetas- repar ten- despe nsa/. Accessed 24 January 2021
1 3
Trends in Organized Crime 
La Opinión (2020c) La Familia Michoacana también reparte despensas. La Opinión. https:// laopi nion. 
com/ 2020/ 04/ 19/ la- famil ia- micho acana- tambi en- repar te- despe nsas/. Accessed 24 January 2021
Lafontaine T, Acoose S, Schissel B (2009) Healing Connections: Rising Above the Gang. J Gang Res 
16(2):27–55
Lallie HS, Shepherd LA, Nurse JRC, Erola A, Epiphaniou G, Maple C, Bellekens X (2021) Cyber secu-
rity in the age of COVID-19: A timeline and analysis of cyber-crime and cyber-attacks during the 
pandemic. Computers & Security, 105. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1016/j. cose. 2021. 102248
Lavezzi AM (2014) Organised crime and the economy: a framework for policy prescriptions. Global 
Crime 15(1–2):164–190. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1080/ 17440 572. 2013. 868626
Leitão L, Martins MA (2020) Traficantes ameaçam comércio em favelas do Rio contra o aumento de 
preço do álcool gel. G1. https:// g1. globo. com/ rj/ rio- de- janei ro/ notic ia/ 2020/ 03/ 26/ trafi cantes- ameac 
am- comer cio- em- favel as- do- rio- contra- o- aumen to- de- preco- do- alcool- gel. ghtml. Accessed 22 Jan-
uary 2021
Lessing B, Willis GD (2019) Legitimacy in Criminal Governance: Managing a Drug Empire from 
Behind Bars. American Political Science Review 113(2):584–606. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1017/ S0003 
05541 80009 28
Levi M, Soudijn M (2020) Understanding the Laundering of Organized Crime Money. Crime Justice 
49:579–631. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1086/ 708047
Lo TW, Kwok SI (2017) Triad Organized Crime in Macau Casinos: Extra-legal Governance and Entre-
preneurship. Br J Criminol 57(3):589–607
Martínez C. Martínez Ó, Lemus E (2020) Pandillas amenazan a quien incumpla la cuarentena. El Faro. 
https:// elfaro. net/ es/ 202003/ el_ salva dor/ 24211/ Pandi llas- amena zan-a- quien- incum pla- la- cuare 
ntena. htm. Accessed 22 January 2021
Monzini P (1999) Gruppi criminali a Napoli e Marsiglia: La delinquenza organizzata nella storia di due 
cittá: 1820–1990. Catanzaro: Meridiana libri. https:// cadmus. eui. eu// handle/ 1814/ 22510. Accessed 
29 January 2021
Nicola M, Alsafi Z, Sohrabi C, Kerwan A, Al-Jabir A, Iosifidis C et al (2020) The socio-economic impli-
cations of the coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19): A review. Int J Surg 78:185–193. https:// doi. org/ 
10. 1016/j. ijsu. 2020. 04. 018
OCCRP (2020a) The Players and the Paperwork: Romania’s Trade in Black Market Masks. OCCRP. 
https:// www. occrp. org/ en/ coron avirus/ the- playe rs- and- the- paper work- roman ias- trade- in- black- mar-
ket- masks. Accessed 22 July 2020
OCCRP (2020b) Questionable Paperwork Lets Fake and Faulty Masks Flood Europe. OCCRP. https:// 
www. occrp. org/ en/ coron avirus/ quest ionab le- paper work- lets- fake- and- faulty- masks- flood- europe. 
Accessed 22 July 2020
OCCRP (2020c) Opaque Coronavirus Procurement Deal Hands Millions to Slovenian Gambling Mogul. 
OCCRP. https:// www. occrp. org/ en/ coron avirus/ opaque- coron avirus- procu rement- deal- hands- milli 
ons- to- slove nian- gambl ing- mogul. Accessed 22 July 2020
Palazzolo S (2020) Palermo, il fratello del boss della droga fa la spesa per lo Zen. la Repubblica. https:// 
rep. repub blica. it/ pwa/ locali/ 2020/ 04/ 08/ news/ paler mo_ il_ frate llo_ del_ boss_ della_ droga_ fa_ la_ 
spesa_ per_ lo_ zen- 25343 9286/. Accessed 22 January 2021
Paoli L, Vander Beken T (2014) Organized crime. A contested concept. In: Paoli L (ed) The Oxford 
handbook of organized crime. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 13–31
Parrinello G (2013) The city-territory: large-scale planning and development policies in the aftermath of 
the Belice valley earthquake (Sicily, 1968). Plan Perspect 28(4):571–593. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1080/ 
02665 433. 2013. 774538
Pinotti P (2015) The Economic Costs of Organised Crime: Evidence from Southern Italy. Econ J 
125(586):F203–F232
Pinotti P (2020) The Credibility Revolution in the Empirical Analysis of Crime | SpringerLink. https:// 
doi. org/ 10. 1007/ s40797- 020- 00130-3. Accessed 23 May 2021
Raeymaekers T, Menkhaus K, Vlassenroot K (2008) State and non-state regulation in African protracted 
crises: governance without government? Afrika Focus, 21(2). https:// doi. org/ 10. 21825/ af. v21i2. 
5045
Reuter PH, Paoli L (2020) How Similar Are Modern Criminal Syndicates to Traditional Mafias? Crime 
Justice 49:223–287. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1086/ 708869
Riccardi M (2014) When Criminals Invest in Businesses: Are We Looking in the Right Direction? An 
Exploratory Analysis of Companies Controlled by Mafias. In: Caneppele S, Calderoni F (eds) 
Organized Crime, Corruption and Crime Prevention. Springer, New York, NY
 Trends in Organized Crime
1 3
Riccardi M, Soriani C, Giampietri V (2016) Mafia Infiltration in Legitimate Companies in Italy. Organ-
ised Crime in European Businesses. Routledge, Abingdon, pp 119–140
Ríos R, Sapalú L (2020) Pandilleros conceden indulto en el cobro de extorsión. elPeriodico. https:// 
elper iodico. com. gt/ nacio nales/ 2020/ 03/ 26/ pandi lleros- conce den- indul to- en- el- cobro- de- extor sion/. 
Accessed 22 January 2021
Rizwan MS, Ahmad G, Ashraf D (2020) Systemic risk: The impact of COVID-19. Financ Res Lett 
36(101682):1–7. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1016/j. frl. 2020. 101682
Savona EU, Riccardi M (Eds) (2015) From illegal markets to legitimate businesses: the portfolio of 
organised crime in Europe. Trento: Transcrime - Università degli Studi di Trento
Savona EU, Riccardi M, Berlusconi G (2016) Organised crime in European businesses. Routledge, 
Abingdon
Scaglione A (2014) Estimating the size of the loan sharking market in Italy. Global Crime 15(1–2):77–
92. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1080/ 17440 572. 2014. 886035
Sieff K, George S, Fahim K (2020) Now joining the fight against coronavirus: The world’s armed rebels, 
drug cartels and gangs. Washington Post. https:// www. washi ngton post. com/ world/ the_ ameri cas/ 
coron avirus- talib an- ms- 13- drug- carte ls- gangs/ 2020/ 04/ 13/ 83aa0 7ac- 79c2- 11ea- a311- adb13 44719 
a9_ story. html. Accessed 25 January 2021
Smith DC (1980) Paragons, pariahs, and pirates: A spectrum-based theory of enterprise. Crime Delinq 
26(3):358–386
Soliz J, Rittenour CE (2012) Family as an Intergroup Arena. In: Giles H, Gallois C, Harwood J, Hew-
stone M, Hogg M, Reid SA, Turner JC (eds) The Handbook of Intergroup Communication (pp. 331–
343). Routledge, New York. https:// doi. org/ 10. 4324/ 97802 03148 624
Stephany F, Stoehr N, Darius P, Neuhäuser L,   Teutloff O, Braesemann F (2020) The CoRisk-Index: 
A Data-Mining Approach to Identify Industry-Specific Risk Assessments Related to COVID-19 in 
Real-Time. ArXiv:2003.12432 [Econ, q-Fin], 1–20
Torres A (2020) Mexican cartels aid country’s poor, who are struggling with the coronavirus pandemic. 
Daily Mail. https:// www. daily mail. co. uk/ news/ artic le- 82184 79/ Notor ious- Mexic an- carte ls- aid- 
count rys- poor- strug gling- coron avirus- pande mic. html. Accessed 6 May 2020
TuBarco (2020) Con amenazas, disidencia de las Farc dice que hará cumplir cuarentena en Nariño. 
TuBarco Noticias. https:// tubar co. news/ tubar co- notic ias- occid ente/ tubar co- notic ias- narino- tubar 
co- notic ias- occid ente/ con- amena zas- disid encia- de- las- farc- dice- que- hara- cumpl ir- cuare ntena- en- 
narino/. Accessed 22 January 2021
UNODC (2020) Research Brief: the impact of COVID-19 on organized crime. https:// www. unodc. org/ 
docum ents/ data- and- analy sis/ covid/ RB_ COVID_ organ ized_ crime_ july13_ web. pdf. Accessed 8 
February 2021
Varese F (2014) Protection and extortion. In: Paoli L (ed) The Oxford  handbook of organized crime. 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 121–141
von Lampe K, Blokland A (2020) Outlaw Motorcycle Clubs and Organized Crime. Crime Justice 
49:521–578. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1086/ 708926
Walsh NP, Shelley J, Fortuna R, Bonnet W (2020) Rio cartels go from running drugs to pushing medi-
cation. CNN. https:// www. cnn. com/ 2020/ 06/ 13/ ameri cas/ brazil- rio- favela- coron avirus- care/ index. 
html. Accessed 22 January 2021
Publisher’s note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published 
maps and institutional affiliations.
Authors and Affiliations
Alberto Aziani1  · Gianluca A. Bertoni1 · Maria Jofre1 · Michele Riccardi1
 * Alberto Aziani 
 Alberto.aziani@unicatt.it
1 Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore and Transcrime, Largo Gemelli 1, 20123 Milan, Italy
